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PREFACE 
Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was 
different from the others . . . . 
 –W.E.B. DuBois1 
 
I start this piece with a personal narrative because I grew 
up in a family of storytellers. Even the story behind my name is 
part of who I am, and how I think, as a legal scholar. My parents 
chose my first name as a mixture of an homage to the cars that 
my mechanic dad worked on, loves, and has sometimes owned, 
and of a Shakespearean female character who saves a life by im-
personating a lawyer and representing her client with innova-
tive, brilliant reasoning.2 It surprised me to learn in law school 
that some use a fictional judge, “Portia,” as a counter to Profes-
sor Ronald Dworkin’s fictional judge, Hercules.3 Despite the 
newness of that information, learning this use of my name made 
me feel more at ease in Harvard Law School classrooms as I took 
multiple classes on jurisprudence. My parents chose a closer fig-
ure when deciding on my middle name, Dolores. Dolores Massey 
Pedro (better known in my family as “Dear”) was my librarian 
grandmother who would enchant us all, especially otherwise un-
ruly kids at my childhood birthday parties, with tales from 
books, her life, and our history. So “every time I tell a story now, 
it’s an act of love in honor of the memory and wisdom of my el-
ders who first told me my favorite stories.”4 
 
 1. W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. & Terri 
Hume Oliver eds., W.W. Norton & Co., 1999) (1903). 
 2. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE (Kenneth Myrick 
ed., Signet Classic 2d ed. rev. 1987) (1598). 
 3. See Robert John Araujo, Method in Interpretation: Practical Wisdom and 
the Search for Meaning in Public Legal Texts, 68 MISS. L.J. 225, 349 (1998); RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105–06 (1977); but see MARGARET E. 
MONTOYA, BEYOND PORTIA: WOMEN, LAW AND LITERATURE IN THE UNITED 
STATES (Jacqueline St. Joan & Annette Bennington McElhiney eds., 1997) 
(encouraging scholars, jurists, and lawyers to look beyond “Portia” for other 
women’s experiences with the law). 
 4. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race Practice, 
95 MICH. L. REV. 741, 742 (1997). For excellent examples of personal narrative in 
legal scholarship, see Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1707, 1710–14 (1993); Margaret E. Montoya, Academic Mestizaje: Re/Producing 
Clinical Teaching and Re/Framing Wills as Latina Praxis, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 
349 (1997) (discussing the relationship between narrative, identity formation, and 
legal scholarship); MONTOYA, supra note 3 (presenting literature on women’s 
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In the summer of 2018, I formally joined legal academia as 
an entry-level, tenure-track professor. As a Black5 woman and 
junior scholar with many Muslim and immigrant relatives and 
loved ones in the wake of controversies surrounding the Muslim 
Ban, the Asylum Ban, and threats to other immigration policies, 
I found my first academic year peppered with panels and work-
shops that centered around perspectives on “nationwide injunc-
tions” that I found astonishing and unsettling. By way of brief 
introduction, injunctions are court orders, usually aimed at de-
fendants, that prohibit or require certain actions. “Nationwide 
injunctions” are probably most often described as injunctions 
that have no geographic limitation and that benefit people be-
yond named plaintiffs or defined plaintiff classes. Recent 
controversial “nationwide injunction” cases have included mo-
tions, some granted, for court orders to prevent the enforcement 
of presidential executive orders regarding immigration,6 the 
Muslim Ban,7 the Asylum Ban,8 certain provisions of the Afford-
able Care Act,9 and more.10 I put “nationwide,” “national,” 
“universal,” “defendant-oriented” injunctions, and other similar 
terms in quotation marks or with a clear descriptor (like “so-
called”) that indicates my viewpoint because I worry that the 
term “nationwide injunction” and all similar terms are a mis-
 
experiences with law to shed light on otherwise unarticulated premises); Patricia 
J. Williams, The Death of the Profane, in ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF 
A LAW PROFESSOR 44, 44 (1991); Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of 
Property, in THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS, supra at 216, 236 (discussing the 
origin and meaning of author’s name). 
 5. As a general practice, I capitalize “Black” and do not capitalize “white.” 
Harris, supra note 4, at 1710 n.3; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. 
L. REV. 1241, 1244 n.6 (1991); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988). 
 6. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2015) (DAPA); Texas 
v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 680–81 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (DACA); Batalla 
Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437–38 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (DACA). 
 7. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 8. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1255–56 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
 9. Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
 10. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(plaintiffs requesting injunction to prevent enforcement of immigration-related 
funding restrictions that would affect sanctuary cities); Guilford Coll. v. 
McAleenan, 389 F. Supp. 3d 377, 397–98 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (plaintiffs requesting 
injunction to prevent enforcement of unlawful presence rules for students and 
exchange visitors). 
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leading and inaccurate framing that biases the debate and 
masks the true concerns and stakes of the debate.11 
At the first panel that I attended where panelists discussed 
their papers advocating for the end of “nationwide injunc-
tions,”12 I wondered if, perhaps, the entire conference was not 
for me.13 After all, it was in the South, a region made up of states 
and people that engaged in a war to maintain enslavement of 
people who looked like me and held out longer and more vio-
lently than other states did in their attempts to maintain a white 
supremacist, apartheid system.14 As I heard what sounded to 
me like panelists’ arguments that courts should not issue injunc-
tions requiring defendants to comply with the Constitution or 
law, I realized that I was the only (visible) person of color in the 
room and that I was one of only two women.15 I started probing 
 
 11. For a discussion of framing and its influence within the political science 
context, see GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT! KNOW YOUR VALUES 
AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004) (applying Erving Goffman’s social science concept 
of framing in the context of political science); Chris Riley, The Rite of Rhetoric: 
Cognitive Framing in Technology Law, 9 NEV. L.J. 495, 500 (2009) (citing LAKOFF, 
supra) (footnote omitted): 
. . . [S]ome worldviews fit some frames better than others, creating the 
distinct possibility of argumentative techniques based on framing. 
Practical framing activity by political machines is based on the 
appropriate choice of language — e.g., speakers describe activities using 
terminology that reinforces their fundamental worldviews. Lakoff uses 
framing to explain Republican political successes in recent decades, to 
which he credits, in part, operatives in the Republican Party who have 
emphasized framing techniques for some time. 
 12. I attended the Federal Courts/Civil Procedure Works-in-Progress 
Workshop at the 2018 Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) Annual 
Conference in Fort Lauderdale on Friday, August 10. 
 13. Previously and since, I had and have felt very much at home at the SEALS 
Annual Conference. I had attended the conference the previous year and had 
received generous support in its Prospective Law Teachers Workshop, a rigorous 
program led by Professors Bradley Areheart and Leah Chan Grinvald to help those 
seeking law professor positions. The networking opportunities and warm scholarly 
communities led to several potential job opportunities and, perhaps even better, 
inclusion in continued scholarly conversation in the form of various workshops, 
roundtables, and conferences where insightful feedback on my work in this area 
helped immeasurably as I improved and refined various articulations of this 
project. 
 14. I am sharing the thoughts that were echoing in my head at the time, but, 
of course, the South is also made up of people who do look like me as well as many 
who fought valiantly to end slavery and segregation, even when that meant fighting 
against their own loved ones. 
 15. That said, I believe that there were only six people in the room: two 
panelists, one moderator/facilitator, and three audience members, of which I was 
one. To my knowledge, nobody in the room identified as LGBT, queer, or 
transgender. 
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my memory, worrying that school desegregation injunctions, 
like that in Brown v. Board of Education,16 benefited individuals 
beyond the defined plaintiff class. That would mean that the de-
segregation injunctions, which arguably are closely linked to the 
grievous nature of the remedied injury, share important struc-
tural characteristics with the injunctions in the crosshairs of 
“nationwide injunctions” critics’ arguments. I felt like I almost 
couldn’t breathe. 
I desperately wanted to talk to (or, really, to text with) some 
friends who are people of color, including some beyond legal ac-
ademia or, at least, outside of my specialty, to vent and to con-
firm what I was feeling. I wasn’t sure if the source of the 
disconnect was the conference, my beloved specialty areas (civil 
procedure, remedies, and federal courts), or my “second 
sight”17—my perspective from the other (nonwhite) side of the 
veil of race18 (or other marginalized identities). I considered 
whether my take on this subject was extremely different from 
most other legal scholars writing in the area, who are predomi-
nantly heterosexual, white, and male. 
Of course, I knew that U.S. enslavement of African people 
and their children had not been abolished by a federal court, but 
the seemingly logical result of the panelists’ arguments sickened 
me. A number of my newfound colleagues in academia appeared 
to suggest that, even if the Supreme Court held that slavery was 
unconstitutional, the Court should not issue an order preventing 
any state from treating humans as slaves and property belong-
ing to an owner.19 Instead, individuals not party to the Supreme 
Court case but nevertheless harmed or at risk of being harmed 
by the defendants’ unconstitutional actions would need to bring 
their own litigation, as a class or individually, person by person. 
To make this hypothetical more realistic, in the New Jersey 
marriage equality case20 that my former colleagues and I 
worked on and won for our clients (couples and an organization), 
 
 16. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 17. Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. LAW REV. 
946, 954, 954 n.39 (2002). 
 18. DUBOIS, supra note 1. 
 19. Recently, some “nationwide injunctions” skeptics let me know that, in their 
opinions, slavery might be unique enough to justify departing from what they see 
as the rules that should govern the rest of injunctive relief. I’ll set that aside for a 
later discussion on whether there’s some other way for nonparties to obtain relief 
that might be sufficiently close to a “nationwide injunction.” 
 20. Garden State Equality v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036 (N.J. 2013). 
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the panelists’ arguments would have suggested that the trial 
court and New Jersey Supreme Court, at most, should have is-
sued an order requiring New Jersey to allow only our seven 
plaintiff couples to marry. The panelists’ arguments would have 
suggested that we should not or could not have received the in-
junction that we requested, that the trial court granted, and that 
the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed—an injunction requir-
ing New Jersey to allow same-sex couples to marry.21 
I wasn’t sure if the panelists did not understand the gravity 
of the potential implications for those without full humanity in 
the United States and what it feels like to think that you may 
have to individually litigate every single unlawful, discrimina-
tory, or unconstitutional law that cuts against you. On a per-
sonal level, this brings to mind my experience of being a college 
student and thinking that I had no choice but to try to work full-
time to earn my tuition, registration fees, and room and board 
because the Financial Aid Office had told me that I would have 
to “appeal” its decision. When the person at that office told me 
that I could not get any aid unless I appealed, I had no clue what 
an appeal was, who could make this appeal, or what the chances 
were of it working. To me, hearing that I would need to appeal 
sounded like, “You will not ever get any financial aid to attend 
school.” And I had graduated from an elite, private, college-
preparatory high school (on scholarship); participated in student 
government; and spoke out on social issues. If I didn’t feel I could 
make a financial aid appeal, how would others—who had grown 
up in much more difficult situations than I had—respond to the 
idea that they would have to individually litigate every single 
unconstitutional or illegal government statute, policy, or order? 
Would it be prudent for each affected individual to separately 
challenge a generally applicable congressional firearm regula-
tion in order to receive an injunction against an unconstitutional 
statutory provision? To have all current and potential future af-
fected individuals joined into a class action? 
 
 21. See id. In this New Jersey marriage equality case, we requested an 
injunction to prevent the state of New Jersey from allowing only heterosexual 
couples to marry within the state. Granted, that injunction might be a “statewide 
injunction” instead of a “nationwide injunction,” but similar arguments and 
concerns likely apply to both. While there are some similarities between “statewide” 
and “nationwide” injunctions—there are multiple district courts within a state and 
within the United States—there are also differences—a state exists within a single 
federal circuit. 
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Moreover, I wasn’t sure if emphasis on formalism led the 
panelists not to see or care, or if reaching a point where margin-
alized people would have to litigate each claim one by one (or 
through a likely impossible-to-certify class action) was the pan-
elists’ intended result. My almost-refrain of “I wasn’t sure” is 
because I wasn’t sure then, nor do I claim to be sure now, of the 
reasons for the differences in my thinking and that of my inter-
locutors on the subject of “nationwide injunctions.” 
My political values and the passions that drove me to prac-
tice law are of the left-leaning, social-justice sort, so those types 
of concerns and potential claims immediately come to mind. 
That said, my experiences and perspective also inform my ap-
preciation for procedural and remedial protections, like injunc-
tive relief, that apply to everyone, including plaintiffs with 
socially conservative and right-leaning causes. These right-
leaning causes include, for example, challenges to: (1) provisions 
limiting or regulating gun licensing and ownership; (2) provi-
sions of the Affordable Care Act that relate to providing birth 
control or abortions; and (3) President Obama’s executive ac-
tions regarding immigration policies, such as his Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Resi-
dents (DAPA) program.22 
To my relief, the panel moderator, Professor Andy Wright 
(also a white man), brought up Stell v. Savannah-Chatham 
County Board of Education,23 where a district court judge in 
 
 22. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Weekly Address: 
Immigration Accountability Executive Action (Nov. 22, 2014), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/22/weekly-address-immigration-
accountability-executive-action [https://perma.cc/7QGN-H2J2]; Memorandum from 
Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enf’t, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r of U.S. Customs & 
Border Prot. 4 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications
/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z7B9-K5MG]. The Obama 
Administration also referred to this program as “Deferred Action for Parental 
Accountability.” 
 23. 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev’d, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964). In 
Stell—which the court decided in 1963, nine years after Brown v. Board of 
Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954)—the district court denied the Black 
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction that would prevent the continued 
operation of segregated public schools. Stell, 333 F.2d at 57–58, overruled in part 
by United States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967). The 
district court dismissed the complaint after accepting expert testimony from the 
school board purportedly demonstrating that there were “inherent” differences in 
Black students’ and white students’ capacities for education and after allowing 
white parents and students to intervene and accepting their expert testimony that 
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Georgia attempted to redecide Brown v. Board of Education24 
with new litigants. Wright noted that the Fifth Circuit had 
slapped down the district court’s decision in Stell25 and asked 
panelists if their proposals would mean that individual federal 
judges could or should readjudicate questions that the Supreme 
Court had decided and for which the Court had issued or af-
firmed injunctions. 
Although the panelists’ responses did not assuage my con-
cerns about their proposals, Wright’s comments let me know 
that I was not completely alone at that conference or even in that 
room—someone else also saw the danger that began to gnaw at 
my insides when I heard scholars discuss “nationwide injunc-
tions.” As a left-leaning Black woman, I am building my schol-
arly home in a field of mostly white men who are debating the 
future of a remedy that Black people have used and continue to 
use—albeit often only somewhat successfully so and in other ar-
eas outside of education—to end segregation and achieve racial 
equity. Without this remedy I would neither have any of the ed-
ucational degrees that I have been fortunate enough to attain 
nor be an official part of this scholarly discussion. Essentially, 
much of “nationwide injunctions” skeptics’ arguments likely un-
dermine the legal remedies used to combat structural 
subordination in the United States. I was truly perplexed that I 
could see and feel this concern, yet many other more-seasoned 
legal scholars did not seem to. It seemed not to be even a consid-
eration for them. 
Unlike the critical legal studies (CLS) rights-skepticism and 
the critical race theory critique of that skepticism, I do not know 
if the basis for the difference in approaches and reactions to “na-
 
educating Black and white students together in Savannah would “impair the 
educational opportunities” of, and “cause . . . grave psychological harm” to, both 
Black and white students. 220 F. Supp. at 668. Stell is similar to Gibson v. Harris, 
322 F.2d 780, 781 (5th Cir. 1963), which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit treated as Stell’s companion case. In Gibson v. Harris, the district court 
enjoined the school board from implementing a plan to desegregate a public school 
because white plaintiffs alleged that desegregation would be detrimental for both 
Black and white students. Stell, 333 F.2d at 58–59. 
 24. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 25. The Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction that prevented the Glynn County 
school board from implementing its desegregation plan and reversed the judgment 
that dismissed the Savannah litigation because “the major premise of the decision 
of [Brown I]” was not “limited to the facts of the cases there presented.” Stell, 333 
F.2d at 61. Instead, Brown “proscrib[ed] segregation in the public education process 
on the stated ground that separate but equal schools for the races were inherently 
unequal.” Id. 
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tionwide injunctions” turns upon some as-of-yet unnamed theo-
retical split, dissimilarities in life experiences due to 
sociocultural differences, or something else entirely. What I do 
know is that, to my mind, “what is needed, therefore, is not the 
abandonment of” the targeted injunctions, “but an attempt to 
become multilingual in the semantics of evaluating” the targeted 
injunctions.26 The potential shortcomings of federal courts’ pro-
cedural, remedial, appellate, or injunctive mechanisms do not 
guarantee that eliminating “nationwide injunctions” is a good or 
better solution than the current mechanisms.27 If we take seri-
ously Professor Daryl Levinson’s contention that there is not a 
meaningful constitutional right unless that right is also sup-
ported by a meaningful remedy, then we should take criticism of 
the CLS abandonment of rights discourse as a serious warning 
about projects to abandon remedies for those rights, including 
“nationwide injunctions.”28 
During the next conference session where the same scholars 
presented these arguments, I felt more prepared to hear them. 
The presentation was also shorter due to several discussions of 
other projects.29 Still, I experienced a persistent pang of danger 
on the subject—it set off my “Spidey-sense.”30 Although I had an 
almost visceral reaction to some of the proposals, I did not see 
an opportunity to make a useful intervention in the area, myself, 
until a few months later. 
At the Tenth Annual Junior Faculty Federal Courts Work-
shop,31 Professor Norman Spaulding (an African American man) 
 
 26. Patricia J. Williams, The Pain of Word Bondage, in THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 
AND RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 146, 149 (1991). 
 27. Id. at 158 (“[F]ailure of rights discourse, much noted in CLS scholarship, 
does not logically mean that informal systems will lead to better outcomes.”). 
 28. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 4 
COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999); Williams, supra note 26, at 163–65. 
 29. This was during the Civil Procedure Workshop discussion group at the 2018 
Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) Annual Conference in Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, on Saturday, August 11. 
 30. “The superhero Spider-Man possesses an enhanced awareness of his 
immediate surroundings that manifests as an acute tingling when he is in danger.” 
Seth W. Stoughton, Terry v. Ohio and the (Un)forgettable Frisk, 15 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 19, 33 n.20 (2017). I don’t claim to be a superhero, nor do I claim that I 
was in literal danger, but some popular culture references come to mind easily. 
 31. The Tenth Annual Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop was hosted by 
The University of Oklahoma College of Law on September 14–15, 2018. A few 
scholars had warned me to be wary of the workshop because some had heard tales 
of what could be called a less-than-hospitable reception of new scholars to the field, 
particularly when those new scholars were women, people of color, or produced left-
of-center scholarship. I do not know what did or didn’t happen in those years; it was 
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provided a powerful, intellectual voice to my discomfort with the 
“nationwide injunctions” conversation with his comments on a 
trio of papers.32 I use the term “conversation” here instead of 
“debate” because Spaulding’s comments highlighted that all of 
the scholars presenting papers at the workshop session were en-
gaging in a conversation that ignored a number of threshold 
issues. His comments made the “nationwide injunctions” litera-
ture seem more like a one-sided conversation than a debate. 
Assuming this one-sided-conversation description was accurate, 
I began to wonder what another perspective on the subject might 
look like. 
Spaulding declared that he would not use the terms “nation-
wide injunction” or “national injunction” because neither de-
scribed the subject of any of the authors’ papers. Instead, 
Spaulding said that the remedy that the papers targeted was a 
prophylactic injunction against the government. Building on 
that idea, Spaulding contended that the first crucial step in any 
paper on the subject must be to define the injunctions at issue in 
that manner. Next, Spaulding contended that a paper must de-
fend why federal courts either could not or should not issue 
prophylactic injunctions or, at least, not prophylactic injunctions 
against the government, in light of the long history of equitable 
and analogous forms of structural and prophylactic relief. 
 
before my time, and I do not mean to dredge up or involve myself in past drama. I 
had chosen not to submit a proposal to the workshop the prior year, in part due to 
mentors’ concerns about whether me attending the workshop might drum up 
hostility toward my tenure-track candidacy while I was on the market for a law 
professor position. Professor Roger Michalski organized the 2018 workshop and, 
like other workshop organizers since him (I don’t personally know anything of what 
happened before), did a smashingly standout job of encouraging me, as well as 
others who don’t fit the typical federal courts scholar demographic, to attend and 
engage. Regardless of how others may have experienced the workshop in years past 
and, perhaps, because of those growing pains, I now thoroughly enjoy the workshop 
and regard it as one of the key yearly conferences (along with the Annual Civil 
Procedure Workshop, organized by Professors Brooke Coleman, David Marcus, and 
Elizabeth Porter, and some remedies workshops to which Professor Caprice Roberts 
ensured I was invited) that contributes the most to my scholarly development and 
my integration in the field. 
 32. Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. 
REV. 1 (2019); Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. 
REV. 67 (2019); Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, 71 ALA. 
L. REV. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions]. I 
don’t mean to suggest that all three papers or scholars take the same position 
regarding “nationwide injunctions.” To the contrary, Professors Trammell and 
Clopton defend courts issuing “nationwide injunctions” in certain circumstances. 
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I call “nationwide injunctions” a “targeted” remedy because 
it seems that the central organizing feature of the “nationwide 
injunctions” debate is which injunctions critics are attacking. I 
worry that the tail may be wagging the dog because critics are 
taking aim at certain injunctions and, perhaps, reverse engi-
neering a label, a category, and a type of injunction that they 
claim fits the targeted injunctions. The “nationwide injunctions” 
category strikes me as a potentially false construction. I do not 
accuse any of these scholars of being disingenuous in their pur-
suits or of intentionally reverse engineering their arguments. 
But if the targeted injunctions are plaintiff victories in lawsuits 
brought primarily from the left, challenging primarily right-
wing governmental actions, and the scholars are primarily on 
the ideological right, perhaps that should give us pause. Per-
haps—along with failing to acknowledge the practical implica-
tions of their arguments for subordinated communities and 
social equality—“nationwide injunction” critics are creating a 
problem where there isn’t one and are reverse engineering a dis-
tinction when there isn’t really a significant difference. Much in 
the same way that colleagues in the field press me to explain 
that my scholarly position is not instrumentalist in nature, why 
should we not press “nationwide injunction” critics? I hope that 
scholars engage with and figure out what the salient character-
istics and groupings, if any, of the targeted injunctions actually 
are. 
Motivated by Spaulding’s charge,33 I set out to write such a 
paper. I wanted to learn about and understand the perspectives 
of those opposed to “nationwide injunctions,” with a hope that 
 
 33. At some point after the workshop, Professor Suzette Malveaux, a Black 
woman who is also Provost Professor of Civil Rights Law and Director of The Byron 
R. White Center for the Study of American Constitutional Law at the University of 
Colorado Law School, invited me to participate in the Twenty-Seventh Annual Ira 
C. Rothgerber Jr. Conference on “nationwide injunctions.” This symposium 
invitation was my excuse to begin putting pen to paper about the subject. When I 
participated in the Rothgerber Conference, it was the first time that I had seen a 
racially- and gender-diverse group of people discuss “nationwide injunctions.” That 
conference presented me with the first opportunity to interact in both scholarly and 
social settings with nearly all of the scholars whom I had seen present their work 
at the prior “nationwide injunctions” discussions. As a newcomer to the 
conversation, I welcomed Malveaux’s warm invitation, and Clopton, Morley, 
Trammell, and Wasserman extended that warmth in spirited discussion and 
collegiality. At the Rothgerber Conference, and a few other roundtables and 
workshops since then, I engaged with several others about “nationwide injunctions” 
who also welcomed me to the conversation—Professors Samuel Bray, Charlton 
Copeland, Doug Rendleman, Mila Sohoni, Russell Weaver, and Ahmed White. 
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doing so would allow me to express more clearly why I find this 
debate so deeply problematic, troubling, and wrongly framed.34 
As it turned out, a number of scholars and advocates outside of 
the “nationwide injunctions” debate—as it existed at the time of 
the conference and as it largely persists today—have expressed 
shock and confusion upon hearing several common arguments 
and suggestions that are routine in the debate. 
 
 34. Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 69 
(1987) (“Although members of minority groups have historically felt an obligation 
to become conversant in the world view of the majority, they have also made an 
effort to preserve their own.”) (citing W.E.B. DUBOIS, SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: 
ESSAYS AND SKETCHES (Dodd & Mead ed., Fawcett Publ’ns 1979) (1903)); BELL 
HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER ix (1984) (“Living as we did—
on the edge—we developed a particular way of seeing reality. We looked both from 
the outside in and [sic] from the inside out. We focused our attention on the center 
as well as on the margin. We understood both.”). 
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INTRODUCTION  
As the number of scholars,35 nongovernmental litigants,36 
 
 35. Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. 
REV. 920 (2020); Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and 
Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 55 (2017); Amanda Frost, In Defense of 
Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2018); Suzette M. Malveaux, 
The Modern Class Action Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and Relevance Today, 66 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 325, 396 (2017); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, 
and the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 64 (2017); Michael T. Morley, 
Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2453, 
2499 (2014) [hereinafter Public Law at the Cathedral]; Trammell, supra note 32; 
Nicholas Bagley & Samuel Bray, Judges Shouldn’t Have the Power to Halt Laws 
Nationwide, ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive
/2018/10/end-nationwide-injunctions/574471/ [https://perma.cc/SA6B-LDCP]; 
Getzel Berger, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government: A 
Structural Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068 (2017) [hereinafter Burger, 
Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government] (arguing that “nationwide 
injunctions” against the federal government should be limited to the circuit of the 
enjoining court); Getzel Berger, Nationwide Injunctions Are Wrong – Even When 
They Stop Trump, L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2017), www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-
oe-berger-injunctions-lower-federal-courts-judges-20170512-story.html [https://
perma.cc/PB57-B77D] [hereinafter Nationwide Injunctions Are Wrong]; Samuel L. 
Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
417, 482 (2017) [hereinafter Multiple Chancellors]; Ronald A. Cass, Nationwide 
Injunctions’ Governance Problems: Forum Shopping, Politicizing Courts, and 
Eroding Constitutional Structure, (Geo. Mason U. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, 
Legal Studies No. LS 18-22, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3231456 [https://perma.cc/WV79-JLXK]; Kate Huddleston, 
Nationwide Injunctions: Venue Considerations, 127 YALE L.J. F. 242, 242–43 
(2017); Michael Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(B)(2), and the Remedial 
Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 657 (2017) [hereinafter Nationwide 
Injunctions, Rule 23(B)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts]; Zayn 
Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (2017) (discussing 
“nationwide injunctions” in reference to both private and public law cases); Kevin 
C. Walsh, Equity, the Judicial Power, and the Problem of the National Injunction, 
JOTWELL (Nov. 24, 2016), https://courtslaw.jotwell.com/equity-the-judicial-power-
and-the-problem-of-the-national-injunction/ [https://perma.cc/F73K-TXC8] 
(reviewing Multiple Chancellors, supra); Howard Wasserman, “Nationwide” 
Injunctions are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335 (2018); Katherine B. Wheeler, Why There Should Be a 
Presumption Against Nationwide Preliminary Injunctions, 96 N.C. L. REV. 200, 
200–03 (2017); Jack Beerman, Two Views on the Nationwide Injunction, JOTWELL 
(Aug. 8, 2018) (reviewing Multiple Chancellors, supra); Josh Blackman, Five 
Unanswered Questions from Trump v. Hawaii, 51 CASE. W. RES. J. INT’L L. 139, 
151–54 (2019); Matthew Erickson, Who, What, and Where: A Case for a Multifactor 
Balancing Test as a Solution to Abuse of Nationwide Injunctions, 113 NW. U. L. 
REV. 331, 370 (2018); Andrew Kent, Nationwide Injunctions and the Lower Federal 
Courts, LAWFARE (Jan. 3, 2017), www.lawfareblog.com/nationwide-injunctions-
and-lower-federal-courts [https://perma.cc/8RAD-ZGWM]; Alexandra D. Lahav, Go 
Big or Go Home: The Debate Over National Injunctions, JOTWELL (Oct. 23, 2018) 
(reviewing Frost, supra); Suzette M. Malveaux, Preclusion Law as a Model for 
National Injunctions, JOTWELL (Dec. 5, 2018) (reviewing Trammell, supra note 
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governmental entities,37 judges,38 and justices39 debating the 
 
32), https://www.jotwell.com/preclusion-law-as-a-model-for-national-injunctions/ 
[https://perma.cc/4MGP-SNWN]; Samuel Bray, Does the APA Support National 
Injunctions?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 8, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/2018
/05/08/does-the-apa-support-national-injunction?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm
_medium=twitter [hereinafter Bray, Does the APA Support National Injunctions?] 
[https://perma.cc/HG4H-EDMZ]; Ronald M. Levin, The National Injunction and the 
Administrative Procedure Act, REG. REV. (Sept. 18, 2018), www.theregreview.org
/2018/09/18/levin-national-injunction-administrative-procedure-act/ [https//
perma.cc/8CPY-8PTT]; Chris Walker, Quick Reaction to Bray’s Argument that the 
APA Does Not Support Nationwide Injunctions, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & 
COMMENT (May 8, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/quick-reaction-to-brays-argument-
that-the-apa-does-not-support-nationwide-injunctions [https://perma.cc/MK6F-
M286]. 
 36. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2015); City of 
Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2018); Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir. 2017); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. 
Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1255–56 (9th Cir. 2018); Casa De Md. v. United States Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., 924 F.3d 684, 707 (4th Cir. 2019) (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
 37. Memorandum from the Att’y Gen. to Heads of Civil Litigating Components 
U.S. Att’ys (Sept. 13, 2018), www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1093881
/download [https://perma.cc/GHV7-ZLUC]; The Role and Impact of Nationwide 
Injunctions: Written Testimony for the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on 
the Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet (Nov. 30, 2017) (statement of 
Amanda Frost), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU03/20171130/106665
/HHRG-115-JU03-Wstate-FrostA-20171130.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BUW-YNTW]; 
see all cases supra note 36. 
 38. Texas v. U.S., 809 F.3d at 187–88; Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 
455 F.2d 818, 826 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoting Mitchell v. Pidcock, 299 F.2d 281, 287) 
(5th Cir. 1962); Sessions, 888 F.3d at 288–89; Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 
F.3d at 605; E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 909 F.3d at 1255–56; Casa De Md., 924 
F.3d at 707 (Richardson, J., dissenting); Azar, 911 F.3d at 583–84; Nat’l Mining 
Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1408–09 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United 
States v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 549 F. 3d 760, 775–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (Wardlaw, J., 
dissenting) (ADA); Jones v. DeSantis, No. 4:19cv300-RH/MJF, 2019 WL 5295192 
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2019) (order granting preliminary injunction); Texas v. United 
States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 680–81 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (DACA); City of Chicago v. 
Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169518, at *7-8, *15 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
13, 2017); Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 280 (E.D. N.Y. 2019); New York v. 
United States Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 501, 677–78 (2019); 
Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 833–35 (2019); Guilford Coll. v. 
McAleenan, 389 F. Supp. 3d 377, 397–98 (2019); Texas v. United States, 340 F. 
Supp. 3d 579, 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018); New York v. Pruitt, 18-CV-1030 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 88832, at *16-17 (S.D. N.Y. May 29, 2018) (Clean Water Act); Batalla Vidal 
v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437–38 (2018). 
 39. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424–29 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(voicing skepticism about federal courts’ authority to issue such injunctions); id. at 
2446 n.13 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (opining that providing complete relief to the 
plaintiffs required a “nationwide injunction”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, 
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965) (Gorsuch, J., noting “this troubling 
rise of this nationwide injunction, cosmic injunction”). The Supreme Court heard 
oral argument in Trump v. Hawaii on April 25, 2018, and released its opinions on 
the case on June 26, 2018. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). The Court found it “unnecessary 
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propriety and even legality of the “nationwide injunction” grows, 
the definition and understanding of what exactly constitutes a 
“nationwide injunction” is surprisingly thin. It is not completely 
clear what anyone means when they use this terminology to re-
fer to an injunction. I realized that, instead of defending these 
injunctions and making a stronger scholarly case for them than 
what had been put forth thus far, I needed to first address ques-
tions of basic definition. What do scholars, litigants, judges, and 
justices mean when we say “nationwide,” “national,” “universal,” 
or “defendant-oriented” injunctions? We need clarification on 
basic definition before progressing to arguments for evisceration 
or exoneration of “nationwide injunctions.” 
Drawing from the literature, we could define a “nationwide 
injunction” as an injunction with the following features: (1) no 
geographic limitations and (2) benefits to people beyond named 
plaintiffs or plaintiff classes. What if evaluating the two compo-
nents of this potential definition of “nationwide injunctions” re-
veals that the targeted injunctions are not unique in the ways 
that current scholarship presumes? Are the only salient charac-
teristics of these injunctions that they have no geographic limi-
tation on their scope and that they benefit people beyond named 
plaintiffs or defined plaintiff classes? Or are there other distinc-
tive attributes of the debated injunctions that have been over-
looked in discussion so far? If most injunctions that federal 
judges and justices issue do not have any limitations on their 
geographical scope, and if there is no requirement that federal 
judges limit injunctions to ensure that they only benefit named 
plaintiffs or defined plaintiff classes, then maybe we should fig-
ure out what “nationwide injunctions” are.40 Indeed, those inter-
ested should figure out what is so special about these 
“nationwide injunctions” before advocating for their demise. 
With the understanding that it is futile, at best, and carries 
potentially dangerous consequences, at worst, to debate the pro-
 
to consider the propriety of the nationwide scope of the injunction issued by the 
District Court” because the Court reversed the District Court decision on other 
grounds. Id. at 2423. 
 40. This type of injunction is not necessarily prophylactic or preventative. A 
prophylactic injunction prohibits conduct that might otherwise be legal or requires 
conduct that is not necessarily legally required otherwise. For further exploration 
of these injunctions, see Portia Pedro, The Myth of the “Nationwide Injunction” 
(2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that there is nearly 
nothing unique about the so-called “nationwide injunction” beyond that the 
injunction is for a public law claim and against a governmental defendant). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3864394
PEDRO_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  5:03 PM 
862 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91 
priety and legality of a remedy without understanding what the 
remedy at issue is, this Essay poses, in Part I, several questions 
central to figuring out what these so-called “nationwide injunc-
tions” are: 
• What characteristics define these targeted injunc-
tions? 
• How do these injunctions compare to other injunc-
tions? 
• Is there something unique about the actions prohib-
ited or required by these injunctions? 
Part II explains that the problem isn’t merely one of nomen-
clature. Bickering over the term with which we refer to these 
targeted injunctions does not do much if there is still little agree-
ment as to what is central to these injunctions and what is at 
stake in allowing courts to continue issuing them or urging 
courts to stop doing so. Part III argues that continuing to debate 
injunctions in isolation from any developed, conceptual frame-
work leads to potentially misguided arguments. In the Conclu-
sion, I highlight what may be at stake if there is not a conceptual 
framework for the debate. In the Afterword, I discuss some of 
the tensions unearthed as I worked to incorporate a personal 
component in this scholarly project. 
Calling attention to this lack of clarity and defining what is 
actually at the core of the dispute41 will likely change the ques-
tions that we should ask and the potential paths forward. Before 
we continue in this “nationwide injunctions” debate, we should 
define and agree upon what it is that we are debating. 
As we do so, it is important to take stock of what types of 
concerns we are considering as scholars debate “nationwide in-
junctions.” The balance of criticisms regarding the targeted in-
junctions involve issues that are structural, jurisprudential, 
prudential, and formalist in ways that would curtail “nationwide 
injunctions” to protect Article II actors, to the relative detriment 
of those injured by Article II actors. There has been compara-
 
 41. Other scholars also are engaging in this quest. See Morley, Disaggregating 
Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 32, at 9 (“I hope that scholars engage with 
figuring out what the salient characteristics and groupings, if any, of the targeted 
injunctions are.”). 
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tively little focus on the potential costs of curtailing “nationwide 
injunctions” for those injured by Article II actors—marginalized 
communities in particular. What are the downsides of cutting 
off, or severely limiting access to, meaningful relief? For me, it 
is worrisome that our scholarly community has begun making 
recommendations about “nationwide injunctions” without even 
knowing the costs to marginalized communities, let alone includ-
ing those concerns as part of this discussion and our analyses. 
I. NOT A MERE QUESTION OF NOMENCLATURE 
Although courts have issued the targeted injunctions in a 
wide variety of cases,42 most everyone refers to the purportedly 
problematic type of injunction in a similar way—as “nation-
wide,” “national,”43 “universal,”44 “defendant-oriented,”45 or 
even “cosmic”46 injunctions. I am far from the first scholar to 
take issue with what seems to be the current naming convention 
for these injunctions. Beginning at the 2018 Junior Faculty Fed-
eral Courts Workshop, held at the University of Oklahoma, 
many started jokingly referring to these injunctions as “Volde-
mort47 injunctions” because of the seeming elusiveness of a 
 
 42. Compare Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 
2017), with Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972), 
and Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 43. See, e.g., Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35. 
 44. See Wasserman, supra note 35. 
 45. See Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 32. 
 46. Transcript of Oral Argument at 73, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) 
(No. 17–65), (Gorsuch, J.). 
 47. Voldemort, or “Lord Voldemort,” is a villain in the Harry Potter book and 
movie series to whom other characters often refer by saying “You-Know-Who” or 
“He-Who-Must-Not-Be-Named.” J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE DEATHLY 
HALLOWS 456 (Scholastic 2007) [hereinafter DEATHLY HALLOWS]; J.K. ROWLING, 
HARRY POTTER AND THE HALF-BLOOD PRINCE 8 (Scholastic 2005); J.K. ROWLING, 
HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX 251 (Scholastic 2003); J.K. 
ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE 141–42, 593, 595 (Scholastic 
2000); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 11, 100 
(Scholastic 1997); see also Darby Dickerson, Professor Dumbledore’s Advice for Law 
Deans, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 269, 292 (2008) (noting that many characters in the book 
did not say Voldemort’s name because of their fear of him and that only a few 
courageous characters said “Voldemort” out loud). Only Voldemort’s bravest rivals 
would dare to speak his name aloud because doing so, through a magic spell, 
enabled Voldemort’s army to track the speaker down for punishment or death. 
DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra at 389–90 (a character explains that Voldemort’s 
supporters are using magic to locate anyone who says “Voldemort”). Even though 
Professor Alan Trammell has insisted that someone should include “Voldemort 
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proper moniker.48 Several scholars have noted that the terms 
“nationwide injunctions” and “national injunctions” are mislead-
ing and inapt49 for various reasons,50 and some have written ex-
tensively about the terminology, saying that this is a question of 
nomenclature.51 
I agree with Professor Howard Wasserman that the term 
“nationwide injunction” has a nomenclature problem. But the 
problem with referring to the geographic scope of the injunction 
is not repaired by changing “nationwide” to “universal” in order 
to refer to the beneficiaries.52 Instead, I contend that the glitch 
in the “nationwide injunctions” debate goes far beyond a mis-
leading misnomer. Regardless of whether one calls the targeted 
injunctions “nationwide,” “national,” “universal,” or “defendant-
oriented,” we do not yet have a functional definition of what this 
type of injunction is or how it differs from other injunctions, so 
we don’t yet actually know if a “nationwide injunction,” by any 
name, is actually a “type” of injunction. All discussion of ending 
these injunctions should pause until we have a clear under-
standing of what they entail and what might be lost if lower fed-
eral courts or all federal courts stopped granting this relief. 
 
injunctions” in a publication (and I think that he is correct about that), he is in no 
way to blame for my perhaps overly substantial treatment of this subject in citation. 
 48. No self-respecting Harry Potter fan (especially not one who has proudly 
waited outside of a New York bookstore for the stroke of midnight in order to receive 
a preordered hardcover copy of the final book in the series) would let it go without 
saying that calling these injunctions “Voldemort injunctions” would be to misname 
a misnomer. Unlike the fear of retribution or death for Harry Potter characters 
saying “Voldemort,” the problem here is that “nationwide injunctions” do not yet 
have a clear definition or accurate title, not that they have a fitting name that 
people are too scared to utter aloud. 
 49. Amanda Frost, supra note 35; Wasserman, supra note 35; Morley, 
Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(B)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower 
Courts, supra note 35; Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 419 n.5. 
 50. Although Professor Amanda Frost also calls these injunctions “nationwide,” 
like Professor Samuel Bray calls them “national,” Frost seems to agree with 
Wasserman that the question of “nationwide” injunctions is really whom they 
benefit, not their geographical scope. Frost, supra note 35, at 1067, 1069 (“[C]ourts 
have issued nationwide injunctions barring the executive from enforcing federal 
laws and policies against anyone, not just the plaintiffs in the case before them,” 
calling these injunctions “a remedy that extends beyond the parties.”). 
 51. Wasserman, supra note 35, at 338, 349–53. 
 52. Id. 
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II. DEFINITIONAL QUESTIONS 
Does this debate actually center on “nationwide injunc-
tions,” and, if so, is it accurate to define “nationwide injunctions” 
as injunctions with the following features: (1) no geographic lim-
itations and (2) benefits to people beyond named plaintiffs or de-
fined plaintiff classes, even when the right may be 
individuated53 or even when the benefits of the injunction may 
be divisible?54 If this is how we define “nationwide injunctions,” 
then, for over fifty years55 and, perhaps, for over one hundred 
years,56 federal judges have been issuing “nationwide injunc-
tions” and the Supreme Court has been affirming as well as is-
suing “nationwide injunctions.”57 Moreover, when the Supreme 
Court has reversed a lower court decision that could be described 
as involving a “nationwide injunction,” the reversal has been on 
 
 53. That a right is individuated means that one group member may be more or 
less injured than another group member such that the harm and remedies may be 
individualized. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted 
Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1681 (2001) (explaining that, in terms of vote 
dilution, the right to vote is “unindividuated among members of the group; no group 
member is more or less injured than any other group member”). 
 54. The right could be technically divisible, meaning that the governmental 
entity could refrain from applying the challenged policy or provision to a named 
plaintiff and could continue applying the policy or provision to every other person 
similarly situated. And enforcement could be divisible, meaning that only a named 
plaintiff could bring an enforcement action; other persons similarly situated could 
not bring an enforcement action unless they filed, litigated, and won their own case 
(likely without the benefit of preclusion). See Wasserman, supra note 35, at 371 
(“Divisible rights belong to the plaintiffs alone and can be remedied by a limited 
injunction protecting the plaintiffs alone. With indivisible rights, the rights of one 
person cannot be separated from the rights of others, thus a remedy benefitting one 
person must benefit other people similarly situated.”). 
 55. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 424–44, 438 (arguing that 
federal courts declined to issue “national injunctions” prior to 1963, the year in 
which Bray argues courts issued “the first national injunction in the United 
States”). 
 56. Sohoni, supra note 35, at 922–26, 973–79 (arguing that courts issued the 
first “universal injunction” of federal law in 1913 and that courts issued the first 
injunction that was not limited to named plaintiffs to prevent enforcement of a state 
law in 1925). 
 57. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (holding that the 
grant of a preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion, but noting that “[o]ur 
disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider the propriety of the 
nationwide scope of the injunction issued by the District Court”); Trump v. Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088–89 (2017) (granting, in part, the 
government’s application to stay “nationwide injunctions” and leaving some 
portions of the injunctions in place); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358–64 (1996) 
(holding that the injunction was not supported by the facts presented and was thus 
too broad in scope); see also Sohoni, supra note 35, at 922–26, 973–79. 
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grounds unrelated to the “nationwide injunction” nature of the 
remedy.58 Although federal courts have been issuing such in-
junctions for a century (or at least a half a century) without 
scholars, litigants, and judges questioning their propriety, these 
orders have recently come under intense fire. 
Critics have a broad range of concerns with these injunc-
tions, including that the targeted injunctions are inappropriate 
or problematic for jurisdictional (which includes historical), ju-
risprudential, prudential, or substantive reasons. These four 
categories of criticism can be summarized as follows: 
• Jurisdictional Criticism: The core of the jurisdic-
tional criticisms is that none of Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, the judiciary’s equitable powers, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or remedial doc-
trine give federal courts authority over the cases in 
question, the claims at issue, or the authority to is-
sue this type of injunction, with benefits extending 
to entities outside of the defined class and named 
plaintiffs. 
• Jurisprudential Criticism: At the heart of the juris-
prudential criticisms of “nationwide injunctions” is 
the idea that, even if federal courts do have the au-
thority to issue such injunctions, various legal 
principles—agency non-acquiescence, avoiding in-
consistent judgments, decreasing forum shopping, 
and matching the scope of relief to the extent of the 
established violation—counsel against courts using 
that power to issue “nationwide injunctions.” 
• Prudential Criticism: The primary prudential argu-
ments against “nationwide injunctions” include 
concerns regarding separation of powers; concerns 
for promoting percolation of cases in the federal ju-
dicial system; and concerns that, because the 
precedential reach of lower federal courts is geo-
graphically limited or nonexistent, those lower 
federal courts should not be able to bind federal gov-
 
 58. See cases cited supra note 57. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3864394
PEDRO_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  5:03 PM 
2020] A PRE-EXTINCTION DEFINITION 867 
ernmental entities, or perhaps other entities, across 
the entire country or beyond. 
• Substantive Criticism: The substantive arguments 
against “nationwide injunctions” turn on the idea 
that the court issuing the injunction may be wrong 
on the merits in its decision to do so, so federal 
courts (or at least lower federal courts) should re-
frain from issuing these injunctions altogether.59 
A potential difficulty with defining a “nationwide injunc-
tion” as an injunction with no geographic limitation that protects 
people beyond named plaintiffs or named plaintiff classes is, 
therefore, that the first portion of the definition (an injunction 
with no geographic limitation) might aptly describe the majority 
of injunctions that federal judges and justices issue. Federal 
courts issue nearly no injunctions with geographic limitations.60 
Another potential problem in this draft definition of “nationwide 
injunctions” lies in the second part of the definition—that the 
injunction protects people beyond named plaintiffs or named 
plaintiff classes. However, to the extent that there is a litigant-
specific characteristic of injunctions (or of a rule limiting injunc-
tions), it is that injunctions are limited to named defendants (not 
named plaintiffs), if even that.61 
 
 59. See Portia Pedro, supra note 40 (citing Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra 
note 35; Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(B)(2), and the Remedial Powers 
of the Lower Courts, supra note 35; Cass, supra note 37 (manuscript at 1); Frost, 
supra note 35; Wasserman, supra note 35; Russell L. Weaver, Nationwide 
Injunctions (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Wheeler, supra 
note 35 (argument limited to preliminary injunctions); Berger, Nationwide 
Injunctions Against the Federal Government, supra note 35). 
 60. “[N]o one denies that district courts have the power to enjoin a defendant’s 
conduct anywhere in the nation (indeed, the world) as it relates to the plaintiff; 
rather, the dispute is about who can be included in the scope of the injunction, not 
where the injunction applies or is enforced.” Frost, supra note 35, at 1071 (emphasis 
in original) (citation omitted). There is typically no geographic constraint on where 
a judgment can be enforced regardless of whether the judgment is for money 
damages or equitable relief. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 3 (“Full Faith and Credit 
shall be given in each State to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State.”). 
 61. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; Plant v. Does, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319–20 (S.D. 
Fla. 1998) (holding that the law would not permit plaintiffs to obtain an injunction 
“to prevent the unknown parties from engaging in what might be illegal behavior 
in the future” and that the plaintiffs had not established jurisdiction); Brockum Co., 
a Div. of Krimson Corp. v. Various John Does, 685 F. Supp. 476, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1988) 
(holding that a “nationwide injunction” against unnamed defendants was an 
inappropriate remedy for merchandise bootlegging); Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Does, 507 
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However we describe the targeted injunctions, they are not 
monolithic. Yet current discussion does not lay out the various 
fault lines or their import for the debate. Some of the targeted 
injunctions are preliminary62 while others are permanent.63 Is 
there a difference in the propriety of these injunctions, or federal 
court authority to issue them, that depends on whether the in-
junction is preliminary or permanent?64 Similarly, some of the 
 
F. Supp. 63, 66 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (refusing to grant an injunction to the band STYX 
because the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over unnamed defendants); cf. 
World Wrestling Entm’t v. John & Jane Does 1–100, No. 6:17-cv-504-Orl-40GJK, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223372, at *5–7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2017) (granting an 
injunction against unnamed, unknown bootleggers selling unauthorized 
merchandise); SKS Merch, LLC v. Barry, 233 F. Supp. 2d 841, 851 (E.D. Ky. 2002) 
(granting the plaintiff’s request for a “nationwide injunction” against unnamed 
defendants after unnamed defendants are provided with service). But see Gunn v. 
Univ. Comm. to End War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 388 (1970) (“Rule 65(d) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that any order granting an injunction 
‘shall be specific in terms’ and ‘shall describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts 
sought to be restrained.’”); Zepeda v. U.S. Immigration Naturalization Serv., 753 
F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) (“A federal court may issue an injunction if it has 
personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; 
it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court. Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), an injunction binds only ‘the parties to the 
action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and . . . those 
persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the 
order . . . .’ The district court must, therefore, tailor the injunction to affect only 
those persons over which it has power.”). 
 62. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2015); City of 
Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2018); Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir. 2017); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. 
Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1255–56 (9th Cir. 2018); California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 
583–84 (9th Cir. 2018); City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 169518, at *7–8, *15 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017); Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 
3d 280, 378–79 (E.D.N.Y. 2019); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 
3d 502, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 797–98 
(E.D. Pa. 2019); Guilford Coll. v. McAleenan, 389 F. Supp. 3d 377, 391–99 
(M.D.N.C. May 3, 2019); Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 
2018); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437–38 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Jones 
v. DeSantis, No. 4:19cv300-RH/MJF, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180624 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 
18, 2019). 
 63. See Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 455 F.2d 818, 827 (5th Cir. 
1972); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1408–09 
(D.C. Cir. 1998); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 673. 
 64. See Wheeler, supra note 35, at 211–15 (discussing the difference between 
preliminary and permanent injunctions and their role in “nationwide injunctions”); 
Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 418–19 (citing to Texas v. United 
States and Washington v. Trump as examples of “nationwide preliminary 
injunctions”); Shae Yatta Harvey, National, Multi-District Preliminary Tour 
Injunctions: Why the Hesitation?, 40 IDEA 195, 196–98 (2000) (discussing the use 
of national, multi-district preliminary injunctions while music groups are on tour 
in order to protect their trademarks); Siddique, supra note 35, at 2102; Frost, supra 
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targeted injunctions prevent the enforcement of executive ac-
tions or orders65 while others prevent the enforcement of statu-
tory provisions66 or administrative agency actions.67 Should 
federal courts treat injunctions in all of these cases the same 
way, or is there something unique about federal courts enjoining 
executive orders, statutory provisions, and agency actions that 
we should consider in the debate and our proposals? 
Many scholars focus on injunctions against the federal exec-
utive branch’s unilateral actions and injunctions prohibiting the 
enforcement of federal law as embodied in a congressional stat-
utory provision. Two stated reasons for this focus are that courts 
issue these types of injunctions more often to prevent the en-
forcement of federal law or policy68 and that most criticism of 
injunctions is specific to injunctions against the federal execu-
tive branch.69 However, few scholars explain whether the same 
concerns and proposals “will also apply to similar injunctions 
 
note 35, at 1069 (discussing both permanent and preliminary injunctions in the 
context of “nationwide injunctions”). 
 65. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 187–88 (DAPA); Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 605 (Executive Order); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 
909 F.3d at 1255–56 (Executive Order); Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 378–79; 
Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 833–35 (ACA); Batalla Vidal, 279 F. 
Supp. 3d at 437–38 (DACA). 
 66. See Hodgson, 455 F.2d at 826 (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 
City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 288–89 (34 U.S.C. § 10102); Azar, 911 F.3d 
at 583–84 (ACA); United States v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 549 F. 3d 760, 775–76 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (ADA); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 169518, at *7–8, *15 (34 U.S.C. § 10102); McAleenan, 389 F. Supp. 3d 
at 397; Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (ACA); Jones v. DeSantis, 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180624, at *1–3 (discussing a Florida constitutional amendment 
known as “Amendment 4” that would automatically restore the right of most people 
with felonies to vote). 
 67. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 145 F.3d at 1408–09 (Clean Water Act); New York 
v. Pruitt, 18-CV-1030 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88832 at *16–17 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 
2018) (Clean Water Act); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 
677–78 (Census). 
 68. Frost, supra note 35, at 1071; Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 
419, 419 n.6; Bagley & Bray, supra note 35; Berger, Nationwide Injunctions Are 
Wrong, supra note 35; Berger, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal 
Government, supra note 35; Bray, Does the APA Support National Injunctions?, 
supra note 35; Wasserman, supra note 35; Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral, 
supra note 35, at 2460; Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(B)(2), and the 
Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, supra note 35; Siddique, supra note 35. 
 69. Frost, supra note 35, at 1071, 1071 n.25; Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra 
note 35, at 419 n.6; Wasserman, supra note 35; Morley, Public Law at the 
Cathedral, supra note 35. 
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against states and private parties”70 or whether their proposals 
offer the same protections to those entities. But some injunction 
scholars may share a parallel concern for state governmental de-
fendants in cases of statewide importance.71 Should injunctions 
that benefit beyond the named plaintiffs be prohibited only 
against federal entities and not against state or other local enti-
ties?72 
In a related discussion of whether “nationwide injunction” 
concerns are limited to federal courts, Professor Samuel Bray 
suggests that federal courts should not grant the targeted in-
junctions against federal or state defendants, but he leaves open 
the question regarding the authority for, and propriety of, simi-
lar state-court injunctions.73 To properly identify the most 
important features of these types of injunctions—when they 
originated and why they originated—and to make decisions re-
garding the propriety of courts issuing these injunctions, it 
would seem that one would need to have more answers than 
questions regarding what a “nationwide injunction” is. These 
questions are rooted in the definitional concerns about nomen-
clature identified at the beginning of this section and we don’t 
have answers to these questions yet. 
III. A POORLY CONCEPTUALIZED TARGET BEGETS MISGUIDED 
CRITICISM 
It is nearly impossible to have a meaningful debate about 
proper limits on the scope of injunctive relief without having 
clearly defined the characteristics of the remedy on the chopping 
block. I worry that the failure to define and understand what we 
 
 70. Frost, supra note 35, at 1071; see also Amdur & Hausman, supra note 35, 
at 55 (noting that “statewide injunctions are a problem for many of [Samuel Bray’s] 
rationales”). 
 71. See, e.g. Amdur & Hausman, supra note 35, at 54–55 (discussing “statewide 
injunctions” and injunctions preventing enforcement of state and local policies); 
Siddique, supra note 35, at 2115–16 (discussing the need to preserve state law 
comity when issuing “nationwide injunctions”); Sohoni, supra note 35. 
 72. Amdur & Hausman, supra note 35, at 54–55. 
 73. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 424 (noting that this “depends 
on a state’s preference either for speedy resolution of legal questions or for an 
accumulation of multiple judicial opinions (in hope of epistemic advantages),” but 
not clarifying what entity decides a state’s preference). See also Amdur & Hausman, 
supra note 35, at 55 (discussing shopping regarding state and federal judges issuing 
conflicting injunctions); Siddique, supra note 35, at 2115–16 (discussing the need 
to preserve state law comity when issuing “nationwide injunctions”); Sohoni, supra 
note 35. 
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mean when we say “nationwide injunctions” has warped the de-
bate. The potential ideological bias in framing the targeted in-
junctions as “nationwide injunctions” also serves to make these 
injunctions seem legally exceptional and controversial even if 
they aren’t. Continuing to debate a poorly theorized so-called 
category of injunctions leads to potentially misguided argu-
ments. In his influential article on these injunctions, Multiple 
Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction,74 Professor 
Samuel Bray discusses the implications of moving from the 1789 
one-chancellor system in England’s Court of Chancery to the 
current U.S. “multiple-chancellor” system, where there are nu-
merous federal judges adjudicating in the equitable realm that 
once belonged to a single Chancellor in England.75 Bray refers 
to federal judges as “chancellors” and opines that eliminating 
“national injunctions” “will keep one Chancellor’s foot from step-
ping on another Chancellor’s toes.”76 In a sense, Bray’s 
argument is to protect federal judges—the “Chancellors”77 of eq-
uitable relief—by preventing judges from having other judges 
step on their toes. No other judge could or should issue a “na-
tionwide injunction” that might conflict with a different judge’s 
decision in similar “nationwide injunction” litigation. But the va-
lidity of Bray’s arguments—and all other arguments that build 
upon Bray’s arguments—depends on what a “nationwide injunc-
tion” is and whether such a category exists. 
If one were to adopt a different understanding of what a “na-
tional injunction” is, one might disagree with Bray’s arguments 
regarding federal courts not having the equitable power to issue 
“national injunctions.” In that circumstance, eliminating or re-
stricting federal courts’ ability to require defendants to comply 
with law would not be a new remedial cloak of power (which pro-
tects judges from having other judges step on their toes). 
Instead, eliminating or curtailing injunctive authority to issue 
“nationwide injunctions” could strip federal courts of much of 
their remedial power over defendants in “nationwide injunction” 
cases. In short, although critics of “nationwide injunctions” may 
be trying to empower the federal judiciary by preventing one fed-
eral judge from stepping on the toes of another federal judge, 
eliminating the authority of federal judges to issue “nationwide 
 
 74. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35. 
 75. Id. at 420. 
 76. Id. at 424. 
 77. Id. at 420. 
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injunctions” could leave federal judges essentially naked.78 And 
this proposition could go far beyond leaving federal judges with 
no clothes. It might actually give their clothes—their remedial 
cloak—to defendants as additional protection in “nationwide in-
junction” litigation. If federal courts no longer had (or began to 
choose not to use) remedial authority to prevent defendants from 
violating the Constitution or statutes and, instead, could only 
prevent defendants from enforcing unconstitutional provisions 
against specific plaintiffs or classes, then the only significant re-
straint on defendants would be whatever limit each defendant 
chose to put on itself. Defendants in “nationwide injunction” lit-
igation would be able to violate the Constitution or statutes 
without a judiciary empowered to issue meaningful orders after 
adjudication. 
Moving beyond the stepping-on-toes metaphor, I admit that 
Bray presents somewhat of a threshold question. In his view, 
because there were no injunctions that controlled a defendant’s 
behavior regarding nonparties in the historic tradition of equity 
“as it existed in the Court of Chancery in 1789,” present-day U.S. 
federal courts do not have the authority to issue such injunctions 
unless there is some more recent source of authority.79 Perhaps, 
with a different framing of what the targeted injunctions are, 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authorized by Congress, 
have long given courts the power to issue these targeted injunc-
tions, and instead, critics of “nationwide injunctions” have the 
burden of proving that no existing rule or doctrine justifies judi-
 
 78. Cf. HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, The Emperor’s New Clothes, in FAIRY 
TALES 91 (Jackie Wullschlager ed., Tiina Nunnally trans., 2004). 
The Emperor’s tailors were clever enough to convince him that they had 
made him a beautiful, though invisible, new suit of clothes. Unable to 
believe, or unwilling to admit, that their Emperor had been fooled, his 
loyal subjects also admired the clothes until an innocent child, heedless of 
politics and propriety, pointed out that the Emperor was naked. 
Id. See also Lino A. Graglia, Originalism and the Constitution: Does Originalism 
Always Provide the Answer?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 75 (2011) (discussing 
ANDERSEN, supra) (footnotes omitted). Please note that I am not claiming to be the 
“innocent child” of this story, but this did inspire the title of another project of mine 
on “nationwide injunctions.” See Portia Pedro, The Chancellors’ New Clothes and 
The Government’s Coronation (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 79. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 424–28, 469. To be fair, while 
Bray says that federal courts must trace any current remedial practice to the 
historic tradition of equity, his inquiry does not stop once he opines that there is no 
such traditional history for “national injunctions”; he posits that such injunctions 
are not justified because they create more risk and harm than benefit. 
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cial authority to issue the targeted injunctions. I argue, moreo-
ver, that some portions of Bray’s historical arguments about 
equity are not as ironclad as they might first seem to be.80 
This Article implores scholars, jurists, and litigants to con-
sider this possibility and engage in an effort to define “nation-
wide injunctions” before anyone pushes further to eliminate or 
restrict them. Otherwise, many scholarly objections to “nation-
wide injunctions” could inaccurately compare cherry-picked por-
tions of our current equitable judicial system with cherry-picked 
aspects of historical equitable systems, misinterpreting deci-
sions that some consider foundational in determining the au-
thority—and propriety—of federal courts issuing “nationwide 
injunctions.” Taking these potentially misguided arguments to 
their logical ends would likely strip the federal judiciary of au-
thority to adjudicate the disputes legitimately before the courts, 
which could create separation of powers and judicial supremacy 
problems. Debating an under-theorized or incorrectly theorized 
category of injunctions could lead “nationwide injunction” critics 
to object to the targeted injunctions due to a misunderstanding 
of historical equity concerns and misinterpretation of so-called 
foundational cases. Additionally, reinforcing equitable practice 
as it existed in England and the Court of Chancery in 1789 could 
also reinforce structures arguably set up to subordinate—or, at 
least, structures that operated consistently with the marginali-
zation of—groups such as women, people of color, LGBTQ com-
munities, and others. 
A. Lack of a Conceptual Framework for “Nationwide 
Injunctions” Could Contribute to Flawed Historical 
Equity Objections 
In addition to noting that the targeted injunctions emerged 
in the 1960s, Bray’s opposition to these injunctions largely turns 
on two notions: (1) that while there was only one English Chan-
cellor, there are approximately 870 U.S. federal court judges,81 
and (2) that the English Chancellor did not grant similar injunc-
 
 80. For a full analysis of Bray’s arguments, specifically regarding prerogative 
writs, see James E. Pfander & Jacob Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex parte 
Young, 72 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
 81. Hence, the possibility and increased likelihood that one federal judge could 
step on another federal judge’s toes even though that was impossible for the one 
English Chancellor to do to himself. Id. at 424. 
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tions (presumably against the Queen or King, “the Crown”).82 
But that approach neglects the relationship between the Crown 
and the Chancellor as well as the way in which the Chancellor’s 
role differed significantly from that of modern-day U.S. federal 
district court and court of appeals judges. The Chancellor was 
the arm of the Queen’s or King’s mercy.83 That means that the 
Chancellor made decisions with which the Crown would agree 
and the Chancellor’s power presumably did not extend to decid-
ing against the Crown.84 
That the federal court system has “multiple chancellors” (in 
the words of Bray) is not as problematic as it may first sound. 
Even though England had a single Chancellor, several English 
courts administered the Chancellor’s equity function,85 and, as 
Bray admits, the Chancellor typically delegated judicial 
authority to masters and a vice-chancellor.86 The common 
practice of multiple English courts administering the 
Chancellor’s equitable powers while the Chancellor also 
delegated those powers to masters and a vice-chancellor raises 
 
 82. Id. at 420. 
 83. See Russell Fowler, A History of Chancery and Its Equity: From Medieval 
England to Today’s Tennessee, 48 TENN. B.J. 20, 21 (2012) (“The king . . . referred 
these petitions to . . . his chief minister, the powerful Lord Chancellor, [who] 
handled them. The chancellor was England’s top bureaucrat, secretary of state, and 
Keeper of the Seal. All legal actions in the law courts began with the issuance of 
writs from his office, the Chancery.”). 
 84. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 425 (“In English equity before 
the Founding of the United States, there were no injunctions against the Crown. 
No doubt part of the explanation was the identification of the Chancellor with the 
King, an identification that was important in the early development and self-
understanding of the Court of Chancery.”). 
 85. THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 675–
76 (5th ed. 1956). In discussing the history of English “courts of equity,” Plucknett 
explains: 
A century later the spread of equity is still evident: municipal courts of 
equity begin to appear, such as the Mayor’s court in London and the court 
of equity in the cinque ports, while a similar process in the great feudal 
liberties produced the court of chancery in the palatinate of Durham, a 
court of chancery in Lancashire, and the court of Duchy Chamber which 
sat in London or Westminster. Indeed, it is already clear that one royal 
court of equity is not enough. So we find such institutions as the court of 
requests, and subsidiary councils with equitable powers for the marches 
and the north. 
Id. 
 86. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra, note 35, at 446 (“[T]he Chancellor was 
assisted by officers such as ‘masters’ and ‘registers.’”). Bray, however, refers to the 
Chancery as a unitary system because the Chancellor signed all decrees. Id. (“This 
sense of Chancery as a unitary institution is captured, in this Article, by saying 
that there was one Chancellor.”). 
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the question of whether the English High Court of Chancery’s 
“single-chancellor” system was so different from the U.S. system 
of multiple federal judges after all. 
Additionally, while it may be true—in a technical sense—
that there were no injunctions against the Crown in eighteenth-
century England, individuals could bring lawsuits against, and 
successfully sue, officials acting in the name of the Crown,87 and 
the Crown’s highest ministers could be impeached through a ju-
dicial proceeding in the High Court of Parliament.88 In the law-
suits against officials acting in the name of the Crown, various 
types of writs, including writs of mandamus, allowed individuals 
to challenge actions carried out on behalf of the Crown.89 Fur-
thermore, our “chancellors,” or federal district court and court of 
appeals judges, are not intended to be the arm of the Crown (or 
a President, Congress, administrative agency, or any defend-
ant). Indeed, nothing prevents our modern-day “chancellors” 
from deciding matters brought properly before them that are 
filed against the President, Congress, an administrative agency, 
or any other defendant. We now have numerous “chancellors,” 
in part, because having scores of lower federal court judges is 
central to the institutional design of the federal court system and 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which calls for “the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”90 
Ignoring, for a moment, that the Chancellor was the arm of 
the Crown’s mercy but federal judges are not the arm of the Pres-
ident, Congress, or a federal administrative agency, Bray’s view 
might support the proposition that federal judges should not be 
able to enjoin the actions of the President, Congress, or federal 
administrative agencies. But questioning our modern-day “chan-
cellors’” authority to enjoin actions of the President, Congress, 
federal administrative agencies, or any other defendant also ig-
nores other significant changes in our present-day system for eq-
uitable relief. It is an incomplete and flawed analysis to only 
 
 87. Ludwig Ehrlrich, Proceedings Against the Crown (1216-1377), in 6 OXFORD 
STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 9–12 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1921). 
 88. JAMES FRANCILLON, LECTURES, ELEMENTARY AND FAMILIAR, ON ENGLISH 
LAW 123–25 (1861). 
 89. See Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 80; Glendon A. Jr. Schubert, Judicial 
Review of Royal Proclamations and Orders-in-Council, 9 U. TORONTO L.J. 69, 82–
83 (1951) (discussing the “Ship-money” tax and finding that the entire tax could be 
voided). 
 90. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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compare the increase in the number of “chancellors” and the in-
crease in “nationwide injunctions” while acting as though all 
other aspects of the procedure and design of federal courts have 
remained the same. Several “nationwide injunctions” skeptics’ 
analyses overlook that numerous other antiquated practices also 
have not existed in the United States as common practices for 
decades.91 
A requirement that modern-day federal court equitable 
practice have a foundation in the Court of Chancery in 1789 
would impose a ceiling: requiring that equitable relief afforded 
today in the United States can only be the same or less than 
what existed in England in 1789. This ignores, without theory 
or explanation, several current U.S. equitable practices that do 
not have a basis in 1789. Many of these modern “expansions” 
upon the Court of Chancery’s equitable powers92 may stem from 
statutes establishing private rights of action (especially in the 
area of civil rights), the institutional design of the U.S. federal 
 
 91. One example is that practicing lawyers in the United Kingdom still need to 
bow to the Royal Court of Arms every time they enter or leave a courtroom. See 
Traditions of the Court, COURTS AND TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, https://
www.judiciary.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-justice-system/court-traditions/ (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/H9SZ-V7UZ]. In describing a bit of the 
history behind this practice, Traditions of the Court explains: 
The Royal Coat of Arms came into being in 1399 under King Henry IV. It 
is used by the reigning monarch. 
The Royal Arms appear in every courtroom in England and Wales (with 
the exception of the magistrates’ court in the City of London), 
demonstrating that justice comes from the monarch, and a law court is 
part of the Royal Court (hence its name). 
Judges and magistrates are therefore officially representatives of the 
Crown. 
The presence of the Royal Arms explains why lawyers and court officials 
bow to the judge or magistrates’ bench when they enter the room. They 
aren’t bowing to the judge – they are bowing to the coat of arms, to show 
respect for the Queen’s justice. 
Id. To properly account for these types of injunctions, when they originated, and 
their propriety, it would seem that we would need to look not just at injunctions 
against federal defendants but also at injunctions against state and municipal 
defendants. Some of Professor Mila Sohoni’s work attempts to do just that and finds 
similar injunctions preceding the date that Bray says that federal courts started 
issuing them. Sohoni, supra note 35 (arguing that the Supreme Court has enjoined 
federal officers from enforcing federal statutes against anyone since 1913 and 
federal courts have enjoined enforcement of state law against nonparties for over a 
century). 
 92. With a particular focus on prophylactic and structural injunctions. See 
Sohoni, supra note 35. 
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court system, and the separation of powers93—all realities that 
differ greatly from equitable practice in 1789. 
For example, in 1789, only the Crown or his or her one 
Chancellor in the Court of Chancery could grant equitable relief, 
and the Court of Chancery was separate from law courts.94 Since 
1938, all federal district court and court of appeals judges and 
the Supreme Court justices—approximately 870 federal judges 
in total—have been able to provide equitable relief and have 
done so in a merged court of law and equity.95 In this way, one 
of the most fundamental aspects of equitable relief—who can 
grant injunctions—has changed in a way not necessarily re-
flected in Bray’s critique of current equitable practice. “Nation-
wide injunction” critics don’t argue that statutes establishing 
private rights of action—especially in the area of civil rights—
are void because they don’t have a basis in 1789. Thus, Bray’s 
insistence that “nationwide injunctions” have a basis in 1789 
lacks the same realization that times have changed, in part, be-
cause newer statutes establishing private rights of action are the 
basis for some of the “nationwide injunction” claims. Addition-
ally, the questions turn more on the notion of what constitutes 
claims, harms, and injuries rather than what potential relief or 
remedies may be. 
B.  Lack of a Conceptual Framework for “Nationwide 
Injunctions” Could Lead to Misinterpreting 
Foundational Cases 
Without a clear understanding of what “nationwide injunc-
tions” are, scholars could mistake decisions irrelevant to the de-
bate as being dispositive. The primary case which Bray 
describes96 as rejecting these types of injunctions as “unthinka-
ble” was not about these types of injunctions at all. Indeed, 
Bray’s framing of Massachusetts v. Mellon97 (commonly referred 
 
 93. See id. 
 94. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 447 (“As England grew, as the 
common law courts grew, and as the various other equitable courts grew, there 
remained only one Chancellor.”). 
 95. Id. at 447–48. See also Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Transformed: 
Preliminary Injunctions to Require the Payment of Money, 70 B.U.L. REV. 623, 653 
(1990). 
 96. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 428 (citing Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts v. Mellon (Frothingham), 262 U.S. 447 (1923)). 
 97. Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447. 
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to as Frothingham due to its companion case, Frothingham v. 
Mellon98) seems to misapprehend the Court’s opinion. 
Bray portrays Frothingham as an opinion rejecting “nation-
wide injunctions” as “unthinkable.”99 He argues that, even 
though Frothingham “is now generally considered to be a case 
about ‘taxpayer standing,’” a more accurate understanding of 
Frothingham is that the Supreme Court, when deciding that 
case, drew from an equitable perspective to reject the requested 
“nationwide injunction.”100 Bray claims that Justice Suther-
land’s opinion in Frothingham focused on equitable jurisdiction 
in a way that is relevant for the “nationwide injunction” debate, 
but it is not. 
For good reason, numerous later opinions describe Frothing-
ham as a federal taxpayer standing case or an opinion standing 
for the proposition that conditional congressional appropriation 
does not constitute a “discrete harm” against a state.101 The 
Frothingham cases challenged the constitutionality of the Ma-
ternity Act,102 which provided for five years of annual 
appropriations to compliant states for the purpose of reducing 
maternal and infant mortality.103 One of the plaintiffs, the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, asserted that the Maternity Act 
unconstitutionally and illegally infringed upon the Common-
wealth’s constitutional rights and powers as a sovereign state 
and “invaded” its citizens’ rights.104 Another plaintiff, Harriet 
Frothingham, alleged that the statute would, through taxation, 
deprive her of property without due process of law.105 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 428. 
 100. Id. at 430–31. 
 101. Rohde v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 737 N.W.2d 158, 172 (Mich. 2007), overruled 
by Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2010); 
Am. Civil Liberties Union of Mass. v. Sebelius, 697 F. Supp. 2d 200, 204 (D. Mass. 
2010); Smith v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 329 F.2d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 1964); Debevoise 
v. Back, 359 A.2d 279, 280 (D.C. 1976); Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 54 F.3d 873, 
883 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 64 F.3d 712 (D.C. Cir. 
1995), and on reh’g, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. 
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2695 (2015); Smith v. Jefferson Cty. 
Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 209 (6th Cir. 2011); Winkler v. Gates, 481 F.3d 
977, 980 (7th Cir. 2007); Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Reps. of the Ind. Gen. 
Assembly, 506 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 102. Act of November 23, 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (repealed 1927). 
 103. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 478–79. 
 104. Id. at 479–80. 
 105. Id. at 480. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3864394
PEDRO_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  5:03 PM 
2020] A PRE-EXTINCTION DEFINITION 879 
The Frothingham Court stated that “[w]e have no power per 
se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they 
are unconstitutional.”106 The Court most likely said this for two 
reasons: (1) federal courts have no per se power to review acts of 
Congress107 and (2) court orders cannot and do not “annul” Con-
gressional acts.108 Although a court can order governmental en-
tities not to enforce the provision in question, federal courts do 
not technically annul those acts or strike down those provisions; 
the actual act of repeal is left to Congress.109 Only Congress it-
self can perform the technicality of striking unconstitutional 
provisions, even though Congress would not be able to act upon 
as-of-yet-unstruck provisions or policies when Congress is sub-
ject to court-issued injunctions enjoining the enforcement of the 
provisions or policies. The Frothingham Court noted that the 
Court may review acts of Congress only when an act creates a 
“direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable is-
sue.”110 In Frothingham, the Court held that the Act presented 
no justiciable, direct injury. 
 
 106. Id. at 488. 
 107. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598–99 (2007) 
(quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919)) (citation omitted and 
brackets omitted). The Hein Court further provided that: 
The federal courts are not empowered to seek out and strike down any 
governmental act that they deem to be repugnant to the Constitution. 
Rather, federal courts sit “solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,” 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 170, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803), 
and must “refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act . . . 
unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, 
when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise 
it . . . .” 
Id. at 598. 
 108. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 145–46 (2011) 
(“Few exercises of the judicial power are more likely to undermine public confidence 
in the neutrality and integrity of the Judiciary than one which casts the Court in 
the role of a Council of Revision, conferring on itself the power to invalidate laws at 
the behest of anyone who disagrees with them. . . . To alter the rules of standing or 
weaken their requisite elements would be inconsistent with the case-or-controversy 
limitation on federal jurisdiction imposed by Article III.”). See also Liverpool, N.Y. 
& Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (“[The Court] 
has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a state or of the United 
States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon 
to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.”). 
 109. McHugh v. Rubin, 220 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2000) (“It is well established that 
Congress may repeal, amend or suspend a statute by means of an appropriations 
bill, so long as its intention to do so is clear.”). 
 110. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488. 
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The Frothingham Court noted that, when plaintiffs show 
that they have sustained direct injury as a result of enforcement 
of an official’s act and seek preventive relief, “the court enjoins 
. . . the acts of the official . . . .”111 The opinion does not say that 
a court can enjoin an official’s acts only so far as those acts per-
tain to the named plaintiffs. Instead, the Court differentiated 
between “enjoining the execution of the statute”—meaning an-
nulling an act of Congress—and enjoining the acts of an official, 
which can include those acts that pertain to entities beyond 
named plaintiffs. 
The Frothingham plaintiffs, however, did not make the re-
quired showing of injury. The Court found, therefore, that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing and categorized the plaintiffs’ claim as 
a nonjusticiable political question. Yes, the Court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ request for an injunction that would have benefited 
nonparties. But the reason that the Court rejected the request 
did not speak to the propriety of the remedy benefitting entities 
beyond the named plaintiffs; it was based on standing and justi-
ciability. If critics of “nationwide injunctions” misinterpret 
Frothingham to say that plaintiffs cannot suffer harm as a result 
of governmental action or inaction and, therefore, the cases in-
volving the targeted injunctions raise standing and political 
question concerns, opponents have much work cut out for 
them.112 Frothingham almost unquestionably turns on issues of 
federal taxpayer standing and political questions, not “nation-
wide injunctions.” And “nationwide injunction” critics do not 
raise concerns113 regarding federal taxpayer standing or politi-
cal questions when discussing the targeted injunctions. 
Frothingham is irrelevant to the “nationwide injunctions” de-
bate. But, perhaps under-theorizing what “nationwide injunc-
tions” are and whether such a category even exists might lead 
interested parties to mistakenly recast numerous cases decided 
on other grounds as problems of “nationwide injunctions.” 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Clopton, supra note 32, at 36 n.215 (describing scholarship on Article 
III standing and “nationwide injunctions” and questioning the logic of this 
scholarship in light of “the rise of nonmutual preclusion”); Trammell, supra note 
32, at 82–83 (arguing that nationwide injunctions are not beyond the “judicial 
power” of Article III courts); Alan M. Trammell, The Constitutionality of 
Nationwide Injunctions, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 977 (2020) (arguing that “nationwide 
injunctions” are consistent with the power of the federal judiciary). 
 113. See supra note 35; see also supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
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Other cases that Bray points to as examples of courts reject-
ing “nationwide injunctions” due to limits of “equity, remedies, 
and the judicial power”114 do not support his argument either. 
In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of Columbia,115 
the Court issued an injunction prohibiting enforcement against 
the plaintiffs. The Court left unasked and unanswered the ques-
tion of whether it could have issued a broader injunction that 
required compliance with the law in a way that benefited enti-
ties beyond the plaintiffs.116 
Bray suggests that the oil-shipping plaintiffs in Panama Re-
fining Co. v. Ryan117 asked the Court to prohibit enforcement of 
the challenged provision against only the plaintiffs and did not 
ask the Court to prohibit enforcement of the provision generally 
because of the “traditional pattern” of federal courts rejecting 
“nationwide injunctions” until the 1960s.118 Bray continues 
that, if Panama Refining Co. were to be litigated now, “[i]t was 
exactly the kind of case that today would feature a request for a 
national injunction.”119 But this prediction seems without basis. 
There is a much more likely explanation than historical eq-
uitable tradition and precedent regarding why the Panama Re-
fining Co. plaintiffs did not request a “nationwide injunction.” 
Those plaintiffs, instead, probably requested an injunction that 
would benefit only themselves because limiting the injunction in 
that way would likely have helped their business.120 If the Court 
issued this requested injunction, the President would enforce a 
 
 114. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 433. 
 115. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 116. See id. at 562. 
 117. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). It is also of note that the Court decided both this case 
and Adkins before the current iteration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the merger of law and equity in 1938. 
 118. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 433. 
 119. Id. 
 120. I have the sense that I didn’t come up with this idea on my own and that I 
saw something either in the case, in other cases, or in articles discussing Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, or in Multiple Chancellors that made me think of this idea. I 
haven’t been able to figure out if this is my own idea or to find the potential source 
for this idea yet. A wise senior colleague advised me that this type of lingering 
concern haunts some portion of nearly every legal scholarly project. I hope to one 
day either realize that this idea was, in fact, my own or to figure out the source or 
inspiration and let you know that this citation is for you. For now, I’ll point to a 
similar idea expressed in another context. See Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for 
Me, But Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2072 (2015) (“[T]he initial plaintiff would enjoy a 
competitive advantage because of the selective invalidation of the defendant’s 
unlawful conduct.”). 
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statutory provision restricting interstate shipment of oil by the 
plaintiff’s competitors, but not by the plaintiffs. That this set of 
plaintiffs wanted a limited injunction for strategic purposes does 
not show that a broader injunction would not have been availa-
ble, nor did the Court so hold. That these business plaintiffs did 
not seek the same type of injunction at the center of the present 
debate suggests only that different types of plaintiffs employ dif-
ferent litigation strategies with different requests for injunctive 
relief. 
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, moreover, the portion of 
the district court’s injunction that the Supreme Court affirmed 
enjoined the defendants “from enforcing any rule or regulation 
. . . under the National Industrial Recovery Act insofar as the 
same applies to . . . petroleum.”121 Bray’s reasons for saying that 
no one at the time understood this part of the injunction to reach 
beyond the plaintiff seems poorly supported at best. 
C. Not All Things That Came into Practice After 1789 Are 
Wrong or Bad 
Regardless of the potential misunderstandings and misin-
terpretations described in the prior subparts, the fact that a 
practice happened with increasing frequency beginning in the 
mid-twentieth century is not a per se condemnation of the prac-
tice’s propriety. Indeed, to many who believe in ending the 
subordination of people of color, women, members of LGBTQ 
communities, immigrants, and others, not much good happened 
for members of these groups in U.S. federal courts prior to the 
1960s.122 If one were to actually turn back equitable practice to 
be that of the Court of Chancery in 1789, we should be much 
more mindful in regards to what conditions we would be com-
mitting ourselves and various subordinated communities. 
 
 121. Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 35, at 433 (citing Transcript of 
Record at 133, Panama Refining Co. (No. 135)) (omissions in original). 
 122. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights 
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 10–11 (1994) (“To say that transformative racial 
change was ultimately inevitable, though, is not to say that it had to transpire when 
it did—largely in the 1960s. Judged from a narrower time horizon, Brown did play 
a vital role in the enactment of landmark civil rights legislation in the mid-1960s.”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3864394
PEDRO_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  5:03 PM 
2020] A PRE-EXTINCTION DEFINITION 883 
CONCLUSION 
In a perhaps unconventional way, this Article picks up on 
the intuition of many scholars and jurists that something is dif-
ferent about “nationwide injunctions.” I suggest that we explore 
as well as define these injunctions and that we determine how 
these targeted injunctions are similar to or different from other 
injunctions. Although this Article only begins down that path 
and does not present a perspective on whether “nationwide in-
junctions” are constitutional or appropriate, I take a first step—
if not make a crucial intervention—toward exposing several out-
standing questions surrounding what we mean when we say “na-
tionwide injunction.” If the only problem in the current debate 
is not having a conceptual or functional understanding of “na-
tionwide injunctions,” then heeding the call of this Article could 
correct that mistake. 
Yet a larger predicament may be looming. If something is 
different about these injunctions, then, before we eliminate or 
curtail the availability of “nationwide injunctions” as a remedy, 
we should define and understand what a “nationwide injunction” 
is. Although the current “nationwide injunctions” literature does 
not frame it this way,123 the debate should turn on whether fed-
eral judges or justices can and should employ general injunctive 
power over governmental defendants exercising general legisla-
tive or executive power. Given that there has been a decades-
long struggle over what protections federal courts must or 
should afford to whom and under what circumstances, it alarms 
me that scholars and jurists are contemplating what may be this 
generation’s most significant change to available remedies with-
out understanding and discussing the potential deleterious con-
sequences of eliminating “nationwide injunctions” for 
subordinated communities. I hope to, at least, put the potential 
effects of this “nationwide injunctions” debate for important so-
cial issues and marginalized communities squarely on the table 
for discussion and consideration. 
AFTERWORD 
Several legal scholars—all much more advanced and accom-
plished in their careers as well as, arguably, wiser than I am, 
 
 123. See supra note 35; see also supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
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and many of whom I trust have my best interests at heart—have 
warned me not to write or publish any of the personal narrative 
portions of this Article until after I receive tenure. But, for every 
one of those scholars, at least four other scholars have told me 
that I have to write this. Fortunately (or unfortunately for my 
career as it may be), I think I do have to write this. And I don’t 
think it can wait. If I waited to tell this story, my story, I cannot 
be sure that I would have the scholarly courage to write about 
the subjects closest to my heart or that, by the time I was “ready” 
to tell my story, there would be a pulse left of the story to tell. 
By telling this story as a very junior scholar, I make a serious 
attempt to do this well and honestly. I welcome your engagement 
as I perfect my craft. I have simply spectacular colleagues (both 
at my institution and around the country), and I, perhaps na-
ively, have faith that, by and large, they will support and reward 
rigorous intellectual endeavor. 
The number of women scholars—many of whom were 
among the first women in their legal area or in their respective 
law schools—who have approached me when I’ve talked about 
this project to tell me that they heard their untold story some-
how within mine floored me. It is an honor that the story that 
felt like it was bursting from my chest might share anything in 
common with the stories of our professors and mentors who, in 
our lifetimes, busted institutional doors open for women, people 
of color, those in the LGBT community, and so many other 
groups and who have been fighting to hold those doors open for 
all that time since. It is because of these trailblazers that I, and 
many other scholars of my generation, (perhaps) have the luxury 
of writing things that are bold and that take risks. During a cam-
pus visit when I was on the market pursuing a career in legal 
academia, a law professor—who was one of the first law profes-
sors I knew and who taught the first law-related course I ever 
took—warned me that she had seen junior scholars let certain 
segments of academia water down their scholarship or whittle 
them into making only uninteresting arguments. I am taking 
that advice and attempting to give you full-strength, undiluted 
me. 
One experience that I had not expected was how much of 
being new to legal academia is learning about the political, cul-
tural, and ideological histories and presents of the scholarly 
spaces we enter: the feeling of wondering if you are in the space 
in which you thought you were or if you know to whom you are 
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speaking and of wondering what the consequences might be for 
being wrong about or unaware of those types of contexts. Some 
legal scholars wear their politics and ideologies on their sleeves 
while others can be much harder to read and assess. At times, 
these characteristics can seem to matter immensely while, at 
other times, with other people or in other circumstances, the im-
portance of ideology, politics, and culture can seem or be insig-
nificant in comparison to characteristics like collegial style and 
personality. 
I could say that I considered not writing the personal narra-
tive portions of this project because I didn’t want to risk offense 
to colleagues in the field and others whom I now consider profes-
sional acquaintances (if not friends). But that would be a lie. 
From the moment I felt the urge to write about “nationwide in-
junctions,” I also felt the urge to tell the story of how I thought I 
maybe didn’t belong at a conference, didn’t belong in my field, 
and why maybe I should never write something on a subject 
about which I felt so passionately and, simultaneously, on which 
I agreed with other scholars as little as it can sometimes seem 
that I agree with many others on “nationwide injunctions.” But 
I know no other way. The stories are intertwined, and I’m not 
sure that their disentangled parts—if I could separate them in 
my mind and on paper—would add up to anything nearly as 
meaningful as the whole. Additionally, I have hope, perhaps na-
ively so, that my federal courts, remedies, and civil procedure 
colleagues will not perceive my attempt to share my story as 
though it is me shaming their own. Like many other scholars, I 
hope to continue discussing this search for ways to illuminate 
areas of agreement and remaining disagreement in a manner 
that leads us in a productive direction. 
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